We examine the relations between national cultures, the multinationality of the firm and its holdings of cash. We develop several hypotheses from well known corporate finance theories and theories of the multinational firm, positing that cultural factors as well as the degree of multinationality of firms influence their decisions to hold cash. In particular, firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance, as a national culture, hold more cash as a way to hedge against undesired states of nature. Furthermore, as a reflection of their longer business cycles, multinational firms typically hold more cash. At the same time, however, the multinationality of the firm moderates the effects of culture on the firm's decision to hold liquid assets. Based on a large panel of firms in forty countries, we present evidence consistent with these hypotheses. While firms in countries with high levels of uncertainty avoidance tend to hold more cash, the degree of multinationality of the firm is positively correlated with holdings of cash. On the other hand, the effect of national culture on firm's cash holdings is lower for multinationals. JEL Codes: G32, M14, N20
Introduction
One of the most important financial decisions the firm makes is how much cash to hold as a buffer against future uncertainty. Firms hold a significant portion of their assets in the form of cash.
The largest corporations around the world reported a total of $1.5 trillion in liquid cash, almost 9 percent of the book value of their assets, at the end of 1998 (see, Dittmar et al. (2003) ). Corporate cash holdings of the S&P 500 companies alone amount to $716 billion in 1994 (Opler et al. (1999) ).
Microsoft reported a cash balance of $60 billion on its 2004 fourth quarter earnings announcement, and is reported to have accumulated cash at a rate of $1 billion per month. In April of 2006, Apple
Computer had 59% of its totals assets in the form of cash and short term investments. Moreover, there appears to be a significant variation in liquid asset holdings across firms as well as across countries. Dittmar et al. (2003) report the median cash-holdings in the U.S. to be $19.5 million per firm as compared with $31.5 million in Switzerland. Cash holdings range from a mere 0.3 percent of assets in Kenya to 15.5 percent in Japan to 29.6 percent in Egypt.
What explains the cross-sectional variations in liquid-asset holdings across firms and countries? In this paper, we propose to answer the question based on the national culture in which the firm resides in, and the degree of its internationalization. We develop several hypotheses of how culture and multinationality interact with each other in influencing corporate holdings of cash, while controlling for all other known determinants. Specifically, we conjecture that firms in countries high on uncertainty avoidance, as a cultural dimension, will hold more cash. Additionally, and against commonly held views in cash management, firms high in their degree of internationalization will hold more liquid assets. On the other hand, we propose that the impact of culture on firm liquidity should be moderated by the degree of the firm's multinationality. We test these hypotheses on a sample of firms from 40 countries and almost 70 thousand firm-year observations over the period 1990 through
2000.
The paper provides a number of important contributions to the literature on firm liquidity. First, based on a detailed cross-country panel, we document that, in addition to the firm-level determinants of liquidity, national culture explains a significant portion of the cross-country variations in liquidity.
Second, we identify and document that, in spite of common cash pooling practices, the multinationality of the firm also contributes to its greater holdings of cash. Third, we, however, report that the multinationality of the firm interacts with national culture in moderating the effect of the latter on the firm's cash holdings. Fourth, we document that once controlling for multinationality and national culture, some results reported in previous research do not seem to hold. Our paper identifies new and economically important determinants of liquid asset holdings, both at the firm and country levels after controlling for all determinants identified in the extant literature (e.g., Opler et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz et al. (2003) ). In a broader sense, we introduce an interdisciplinary perspective in understanding firm holdings of liquidity, encompassing the literatures in finance, culture and the theories of the multinational firm from international business.
One of the motives for holding cash, advanced in the finance literature, is a precautionary one of avoiding the risks and costs of shortage of liquidity. Firms hold liquid assets to provide a buffer to meet unexpected contingencies. Firms' liquid asset holdings increase with increases in its operational and macroeconomic uncertainty (see, e.g., Keynes (1934) and Baum et al. (2005) for recent evidence).
We argue that the degree to which firm managers respond to uncertainty depends also on their cultural predisposition towards it. Individuals vary in their perception as well as tolerance of uncertainty. A large body of literature in psychology reports that an individual's perception of uncertainty and her coping mechanisms are influenced significantly by the national culture in which the individual resides. Hofstede (2001) , for example, documents a wide variation in the perceived level of uncertainty and the extent of uncertainty avoidance behavior across national cultures. We, therefore, propose that, ceteris paribus, firms residing in a country with high level of uncertainty avoidance, as a cultural attribute, would hold more liquid assets, and hence cash, on average.
Theories of the multinational enterprise provide us with rationale for the existence of the MNC as distinct from domestic firms. Multinationals are different, because they are exposed to new cultures and business practices because of their frequent foreign contacts. According to Kogut and Zander (1993) , firms operating in diverse national settings develop a richer knowledge base and stronger technological capabilities than firms that are exposed only to domestic markets. As a result, firms and managers that remain in only one country will have a less rich pool of experiences upon which to base their decisions. Thus, the goals and decisions of a purely domestic firm with domestic managers will only reflect the values of the society in which it exists. These domestic firms lack experiential knowledge of foreign markets and international competition. Under this isolation, managers and firms will likely incorporate only the local culture into their decisions, behaviors and processes. Thus, we conjecture that an increase in the multinationality or internationalization of the firm reduces the impact of (local) national culture on firm behavior, including its holdings of liquid assets such as cash.
We examine empirically the relations among national culture, multinationality and corporate liquid-asset holdings using data from a large panel of firms across 40 countries for the period 1990 through 2000. We find strong evidence consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find that national culture -particularly, uncertainty avoidance as a cultural attribute -is an economically and statistically significant predictor of firms' liquid asset holdings. Firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance hold more liquid assets. A one standard deviation change in the uncertainty avoidance index across countries produces a five percent increase in liquid assets holdings. Second, the degree of multinationality of the firm increases its holdings of liquid assets. Third, the predictive power of culture as an explanatory variable of liquid asset holdings decreases with the degree of internationalization of the firm. Indeed, the interaction between the culture proxy and multinationality is negative.
These findings have important implications for future research. First, the evidence that multinational firms' decisions are different from domestic firms' implies that cross-country comparisons should account for the multinationality of the firms in their samples. Second, while our evidence indicates that culture affects corporate financial decisions, it also underscores that national culture does not affect all firms in the same way. Because of the interaction, the impact of national culture is more pronounced for firms with less foreign exposure. The implication is that the effects of culture on the financial decisions of the firm should take into account the moderating effects of multinationality.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief summary of the motivation and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical results, and section 4 provides concluding remarks.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Three main lines of literature have motivated the paper. The first is research on the determinants of corporate liquid asset holdings. The second relates to culture and its possible influence on financial decisions of the firm. The third line of research is theories of the multinational firm from the international business literature. This section provides a brief synthesis of these literatures and develops testable hypotheses.
Corporate liquid holdings and its determinants

Models explaining liquid holdings
For a value-maximizing manager, the level of liquid assets to hold solely depends on the marginal costs and benefits of each additional dollar on hand. There is an optimal level of liquid-asset holding that reflects the tradeoff between these costs and benefits. Early models such as the ones presented by Keynes (1934) and Baumol (1952) adopt this view and take an inventory approach to the problem. In these models, liquid assets are held because they provide two main benefits; the first use of liquid assets is transactional. Liquid assets are cheaper to use than fixed assets to finance daily operations 2 . The second use of liquid assets is precautionary; firms hold cash as a buffer against undesired states of nature. On the other hand, holding liquid assets entails an opportunity cost because of the liquidity premium.
A third reason, not explicitly included in previous models, for firms to hold cash is for speculative uses. Firms can easily deploy liquid assets to take advantage of opportunities. Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a model in which there is asymmetric information between the owner manager and the equity market. The owner manager knows the real value of assets in place but the equity market does not. The choice of financing by the firm becomes a signal of the value of the assets. Under this model, the firm will hold cash as a financial slack so that it can be used to finance investments when equity or debt financing is too expensive. The model's key prediction is a "pecking" order in corporate financing, in which cash will always be preferred to debt and equity. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that managers will prefer holding liquid assets to debt or equity because cash increases their discretion while debt and equity are accompanied by external monitoring. Jensen (1986) proposes that managers of firms with free cash flow will likely engage in value decreasing acquisitions rather than increasing dividends to shareholders.
The predictions of these classic models of firm-liquidity are summarized in Opler et al. (1999) provide an extensive empirical analysis of the determinants of liquid assets at the firm level. Their study concentrates on US firms; their sample is comprised of almost 90
Firm-level determinants of liquid holdings -evidence
thousand firm-year observations over the period 1971 through 1994. In particular, focusing on firm cash-holdings, they provide evidence that supports both the static tradeoff and the agency theory models. They find that firms with strong growth opportunities, in general, hold more cash. Firms that invest more (high capital expenses) and research more tend to hold more liquid assets. Alternatively, firms with greater access to capital markets such as large firms (with less asymmetric information problems) hold lower levels of cash. Additionally, they find that leverage is negatively correlated with cash holdings.
Country-level determinants of liquid holdings -evidence
More recently, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) have expanded the extant evidence to include determinants of cross-country differences in cash holdings of firms. They find that country specific characteristics such as country risk, and corruption explain a significant portion of the cross-country variation in cash holdings. They argue that countries with high country-risk and corruption may impose higher agency costs on firms. The low quality of governmental, financial and / or regulatory institutions could entice managers to divert corporate resources for private benefits. Since liquid assets could be more easily diverted, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) argue that firms in countries with high countryrisk should hold more cash. Based on a sample of firms in 35 countries over the period 1988 through 1999, they find that the level of cash-holdings is positively correlated with country risk and corruption.
They also report inflation as having a negative impact on cash holdings. Firms prefer to lower their holdings of cash in anticipation of it losing value during inflation.
Culture and Finance
Culture
The most common operationalization of culture is to view it as a value system. Values can be defined as "… an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite" (Rokeach (1973) . Under this framework, culture can then be defined as a set of rules and standards abstracted from individuals' values (Parson and Shils (1951)), or as "… patterned ways of thinking feeling and reacting…" (Kluckhohn (1954) ) or as "… the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of a group from another (Hofstede (2001) ).
Undoubtedly the most popular and frequently cited work on culture as a value system is Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 2001 3 . The popularity of the Hofstede's concepts of culture in academia cannot be underestimated. Appendix I summarizes the number of business related journal articles that have "Culture's Consequences" in their references 4 . As a former IBM employee, Geert Hofstede 3 Since the publication of the first edition of Cultures Consequences, many researchers have successfully replicated
Hofstede's findings. For example, Søndergaard (1994) finds support in a review of 61 replications of different characteristics. Hoppe (1990) , using the same IBM questionnaire on a sample of business leaders of European countries, was able to obtain the same dimensions. The validity of Hofstede's findings has also been corroborated by studies using different samples. For example Helmreich and Wilhelm (1998) and Merritt (1998) people do not use all five dimensions in every situation they face. Masculinity and power distance are helpful in explaining other business practices such as differences in organizational structures in cross-country studies, but do not have a clear theoretical implication for liquid asset holdings.
There are several mechanisms through which culture affects behavior. According to Schwartz
Hofstede's works have been presented by McSweeney (2002) and Baskerville (2003) . In essence, both studies argue that national borders should not be equated to cultures, and that work values cannot be equated to national values. McSweeney (2002) questions the methodology and assumptions used by Hofstede, noting how the IBM responses can shed light about work values but not necessarily about overall or general values since they were work-related questions administered in the formal work place. Baskerville (2003) argues that the Hofstede's cultural dimensions may be "embedded" in socioeconomical data. For example, Power Distance is highly correlated with education while Uncertainty Avoidance is highly correlated with age of the respondent. as Individualism is correlated to organizational size and GNP, and Masculinity is correlated with the percentage of professional and technical females in the work force. In Baskerville's view, Hofstede's dimensions could be replicated by simply using a pool of socio-economic data. Accordingly, all social institutions (including family, school system, religious establishment, and political system) will include and propagate these values in their goals and conduct. As a result, cultural dimensions can provide corporate managers, as members of the social institutions, incentives or disincentives to the holdings of corporate liquid-assets by imposing an additional cost or benefit to the manager-shareholder making the decision. For example, in an uncertainty-averse society, a manager who wants to reduce inventory by adopting a Just In Time (JIT) inventory system may be seen as "taking too much risk" and will face higher (perhaps non-pecuniary) costs than a manager in a uncertainty-neutral culture.
Uncertainty avoidance as a cultural dimension and liquid-asset holdings
The economics literature has attempted a variety of approaches to empirically measure agents' Hofstede, a low ranking indicates that the country has high tolerance for uncertainty, it is less concerned about ambiguity and the future and has more tolerance for a variety of opinions. This is reflected in a society that allows rule breaking, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks. A high uncertainty avoidance ranking indicates the country has low tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.
This creates a rule-oriented society that institutes laws, rules, regulations, and other controls in order to reduce the amount of stress that uncertainty creates in individuals. Managers in countries with high values of uncertainty avoidance will be less willing to take risks and will perceive cash as an instrument to hedge against future undesired states of nature.
Managers use a variety of risk-management tools to cope with risks of different types at a variety of costs. These hedging tools differ in terms of costs and benefits, the specificity of the risk covered and their availability. The most risk-specific tools include financial derivatives and insurance, which offer a hedge against a specific undesired state of nature. Other less specific tools include debt arrangements such as the use of letters of credit, contingent debt, equity offerings and the holdings of liquid assets. Liquid assets can be considered negative debt which can be quickly deployed when the state of nature is not favorable, they can be considered as a very versatile risk management tool. There is an opportunity cost to holding liquid assets because of the liquidity premium. All else equal, riskaverse firm-managers should hold higher levels of liquid assets. To the extent that an individual's perception of risk and uncertainty as well as her coping mechanisms are significantly influenced by the national culture in which the individual resides, we expect managers in countries high on the cultural attribute of uncertainty avoidance to hold more liquid assets, on average. Thus, to formalize, we propose that:
H1: The cash holdings of a firm are positively correlated with the degree of uncertainty avoidance of the national culture in which it resides.
Theories of the multinational firm and liquid-asset holdings
While culture could explain cross-country variations in corporate liquidity, the effect of culture may not be uniform across firms within the same national culture. In addition to the firmlevel determinants of liquidity, the international experience of firms can serve as a moderator of the effects of country-specific cultures and may account for the within-culture diversity in corporate liquid-asset holdings.
To begin, the internationalization of firms' operations would more likely increase the need for liquid-asset holdings because it will extend its business cycle. The need to support export activities would require longer terms of credit, less stringent credit policy and maintenance of larger inventories, all of which contributes to a higher level of working capital. In addition, the operation of a complex network of subsidiaries tends to increase the number and degree of contingencies that require maintaining a larger buffer in the form of, among others, liquid-asset holdings.
An alternative hypothesis, suggested in international finance text books is the practice of cash pooling by MNCs. The objective of cash pooling for the multinational firm is to bring together debit and credit balances of all subsidiaries. This way the MNC creates an internal capital market that could more efficiently allocate resources and thus store a lower amount of liquid assets. Therefore, the answer to this question should be an empirical one. However, cash pooling is a practice also available to any mid size and large domestic firm with divisions in different industries or subsidiaries in different regions within the country. The practice of cash pooling should be captured with our proxy for size. Consider two firms equal in every respect except that one is geographically diversified within its own country and the other across countries. We argue that the internationalized firm will face a longer and more unpredictable business cycle which will increase their need for liquid assets. For these reasons we posit
H2 Liquid asset holdings of the firm are positively correlated with its degree of multinationality;
On the other hand, multinational corporations learn from and adapt to their diverse foreign experiences, which prevent them from excessive influences of only one national culture. Thus, internationalization could also have a moderating role on the effect of national culture on firm liquid-asset holdings.
As the firm begins to trade and expand internationally, managers are provided with opportunities to learn other cultures' "ways of doing things." This learning could be illustrated by an example. In the first stage, the firm's international activities are restricted to foreign trade. The marketing division is most likely the functional department that has information about foreign markets and potential foreign customers. Information from foreign markets may imply that firms need to make simple adjustments to meet the new needs. These changes could be product labeling and/or packaging or adjustment of order sizes that better satisfy customer demands. Subsequent stages of internationalization can lead firms to opening sales subsidiaries abroad, followed by acquiring other firms or launching operating facilities. These developments force the firm to deal with evermore complex issues such as effective communication with language barriers, and psychic distance that influence the management of operations.
The organizational learning theory developed in Kogut and Zander (1993) and expanded in Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) suggest that firms are social communities specializing in the transfer of knowledge and that firms operating in diverse national settings can develop a richer knowledge structure and stronger technological capabilities than firms that are exposed only to domestic markets.
As a result, firms and managers that remain in one country will have a less rich pool of experiences upon which to base their decisions. Experience is a source of learning, and diverse environments increase new ideas and events to which the firm and/or manager are exposed. In this knowledge-based framework, the goals and decisions of a purely domestic firm with domestic managers will only reflect the values of the society in which it exists. External influences will be restricted to objective knowledge 5 ; these domestic firms will then lack experiential knowledge of foreign markets and international competition. Under this isolation, managers and firms will likely incorporate only the local culture into their decisions, behavior and processes. Since the opportunity to learn from foreign competition is limited, domestic firms can only look inside their countries for examples and guidance.
The foregoing review suggests that multinational firms are different from domestic firms in that they have foreign exposure and experience in operating in multiple cultures. Therefore multinational firms have a much richer pool of experiences from which to make their decisions and, since the multinational firm is no longer embedded only in the domestic culture, we thus propose:
5 Penrose (1959) proposes two kinds of knowledge: Objective knowledge, which can be taught and, experiential knowledge, which can only be acquired through personal experience.
H3 The impact of culture as a determinant of corporate liquid asset holdings is lower for multinational firms compared to their domestic equivalents.
Data and analysis
To examine the veracity of our hypotheses empirically, we assemble detailed data on a large panel of firms across forty countries with close to 70 thousand firm-year observations for 1990-2000.
The firm-level data for the study are obtained from the Worldscope database. We exclude firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) because their holdings of liquid assets could be the result of government regulation or arise from reasons different from those discussed in the previous sections.
Other industries excluded for similar reasons are utilities (SIC codes 4300 to 4399) and postal services (SIC codes 4900 to 4999). We also exclude firm-years with negative or missing values for sales, total assets, cash and short-term investments and working capital.
Dependent variable
For the purpose of replication and comparability, most variables in our study have been constructed following Opler et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz et al. (2003) . Cash & short-term investments (CASH) is our proxy for liquid assets, CASH is measured as the ratio of cash and short term investments over the difference between total assets minus cash and short-term investments.
Main explanatory variables
Our measure of culture is UNCERT, the country level uncertainty avoidance from Hofstede (2001) which measures the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within society as an attribute of its national culture. According to Hofstede, a low uncertainty avoidance ranking reflects a society that is less rule-oriented, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks.
Countries with low scores in uncertainty avoidance are more tolerant to a changing environment;
higher values of uncertainty avoidance imply that managers are less willing to take risks and are willing to hold more liquid assets in exchange for some risk hedging. In line with our H1, we expect this coefficient to be positive and significant indicating that firms in risk averse countries use more liquid assets as a hedging tool.
Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (FGN_SALES), is the proxy for the degree of internationalization of the firm. The higher the percentage of sales generated abroad, the higher degree of foreign exposure of the firm. This proxy has been extensively used in international business literature. From our H2 we expect this coefficient to be positive which would be indicative of multinational firms holding more liquid assets to fulfill their longer business cycle.
The interaction between multinationality and culture is estimated using FGN SALES X UNCERT. From H3, we expect this coefficient to be negative and significant indicating that multinationality lowers the impact of culture on corporate liquid asset holdings.
Firm level controls,
Growth opportunities (GROWTH), firms with high growth opportunities will be more likely to have more projects to invest in. In an asymmetric information framework, managers of these firms may find it difficult to convey the real value of the investment opportunity to the debt and equity markets and prefer to hold cash as financial slack. It is expected that GROWTH will be positively correlated with liquid asset holdings. GROWTH is calculated as the ratio of market capitalization plus total assets plus total liabilities over total assets.
Firm size (L_ASSETS), large firms have lower information asymmetries compared to small firms. It is less costly for large firms to convey information about the real value of their projects so they access debt and equity markets to obtain financing. Therefore the relation between liquid asset holdings and firm size should be negative. L_ASSETS is measured as the log of total assets at the end of each year.
Research and development (RD_SALES) can be considered another instance of information asymmetries because they represent investments in assets whose values are hard to measure. Firms with high R&D expenses are expected to hold more liquid assets. In our study, RD_SALES is measured as the ratio of research and development expenses over total sales.
Cash flow over assets (CF_ASSETS) firms with higher cash flows will be more likely to accumulate liquid assets. Agency costs of managerial discretion indicate that entrenched managers would prefer to hold liquid assets as a mechanism to avoid oversight by banks and deriving private benefits. However, if managers' goals are in line with those of shareholders, and if the quality of institutions is good, they should hold less cash. CFASSETS is estimated as the net cash flow of operating activities over the difference of total assets minus cash and short-term investments.
Capital expenses (CAPEXP), Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms save financial slack to fund future investment opportunities. For this reason we expect that firms with high levels of current investment should have lower levels of liquid assets. CAPEXP is calculated as the ratio of additions to fixed assets over total assets.
Corporate debt (LEVERAGE), firms with high leverage will be subject to monitoring and financial covenants from banks and bond holders. In an agency framework managers will prefer to have low debt to divert liquid assets to derive private benefit. On the other hand, firms with high leverage need liquid resources to service it, therefore it is expected that leverage should be negatively correlated with liquid asset holdings, LEVERAGE is calculated as total liabilities over total assets.
Net working capital (NWCASSETS), cash is not the only choice of liquidity a firm has, we utilize working capital as a control and we expect it to be negatively correlated with our dependant variable. NWCASSETS is measured as the ratio of net working capital over net assets. Net working capital is computed as working capital minus cash & short-term investments, while net assets are computed as total assets less cash & short-term investments. Pinkowitz et al. (2003) argue that the quality of institutions in a country explains corporate liquid asset holdings. They use an agency theory approach to suggest that when the quality of institutions in a country is low, managers will prefer liquid assets because they can derive private benefits from them more easily than non liquid assets. To account for the quality of institutions identified in Pinkowitz et al. (2003) Property Rights (PROP) measures the degree of protection of private property and property rights; the extent to which the government respects property rights by enforcing the law; and how safe private property is from expropriation. Managers in countries with low investor protection will prefer liquid assets because they can appropriate then easier. It is expected that countries with better property rights protection should hold lower levels of liquid assets. This variable is also obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World reports.
Country level controls
Quality of the banking system (BANK) refers to the quality of the banking system measured by the government involvement in the financial sector; more regulations would imply lower freedom. It is expected that firms in countries with low quality banking system will hold more liquid assets as a precautionary measure. This variable is also obtained from the Economic Freedom of the World reports.
Legal system (CIVIL LAW), the influence of legal systems as an explanatory variable is controlled for using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country has a civil law system.
Countries with civil law system have also been described as being bank oriented (instead of market oriented). It is expected that firms in civil law countries hold lower levels of liquid assets. The data for this variable was obtained from LLSV (1998).
Country risk (COUNTRY RISK), firms in countries with high political risk should hold higher levels of liquid assets. COUNTRY RISK is obtained from the rankings of Coface.
Corruption (CORRUPTION) Pinkowitz et al. (2003) propose that when corruption is high, firms face the need to pay off functionaries and need to have liquid assets available. In this case managers will hold high levels of liquid assets. An alternative view, proposed here, suggests that companies recognize that in an environment of corruption managers' discretion should be limited. If this were the case, firms should have lower levels of liquid assets to "avoid temptation". CORRU is the corruption index published by Transparency International.
Table II presents summary statistics of the key variables by country; the first column shows the count of firm-year observations. As expected, developed countries contribute more firms to our sample. The United States has the largest number of firms in the sample accounting for 28% of both the overall sample. The second largest country in the overall sample is Japan with 9,589 firm year observations, amounting to 14%. The second column shows the count of firm-year observations of a subsample comprised of companies reporting foreign sales greater than zero. The United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan combined account for almost 46% percent of this subsample. It is clear from the table that some countries have a greater proportion of multinational firms than others.
The third column of Table II Column four of Table II shows the levels of cash held in each country which vary widely.
Firms from Norway and Sweden hold on average cash ratios greater than 0.3 while firms in Portugal and New Zealand on average hold a ratio of 0.05 Table II also illustrates in column five, that our proxy for culture levels also varies widely;
Belgium, Japan, Poland and Portugal are amongst the countries with the highest values for UNCERT while Denmark, Sweden, Hong Kong and Singapore are the countries with the lowest values. Column six shows the mean foreign sales by country. It can be seen that while a significant portion of US firms (34%) are selling abroad, their level of internationalization is not very high (12%). On the other hand, only 29% of Norwegian firms sell abroad but their foreign sales comprise 56% of total sales. Columns 6 One potential limitation of the dataset is that, because of different disclosure standards and reporting requirements amongst countries, some firms may choose to not report foreign sales. A common problem in databases is that recent years tend to have more information than older years. As time passes more and more firms are reporting their foreign sales information. To control for this possible bias, we have run the analysis restricting the data to the 1995 -2000 period and the results presented in this paper are unaltered.
seven through thirteen show the mean values for our control variables.
We can further our understanding of our sample by reading table III which presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for selected variables. This preliminary evidence seems to be in disagreement with our H1, the correlation between UNCERT and CASH is negative. In the case of our H2, the correlation between CASH and FGN SALES is positive yet insignificant. In line with theory and previous evidence, the correlations between CASH and the proxies for information asymmetry (GROWTH, L_ASSETS, and RDSALES) have the expected signs. The same can be said of the proxies for quality of institutions, (such GDP and INFLATION).
Regression Results
To examine the relations between culture, multinationality and liquid-asset holdings that are emerging from the data while controlling for other known determinants, we estimate regression equations of the following form:
where the subscript ict refers to firm, country and year respectively
The FIRM control variables are used in Opler et al. (1999) as firm-level determinants. For robustness, the model is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments obtaining Newey West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix and fixed industry and year effects. Table IV shows the results of estimating equation 1, panel A includes all the firm-year observations in our sample. Consistent with our hypotheses, the higher the uncertainty avoidance a country exhibits, the higher the holdings of liquid assets, holding all other determinants constant.
After controlling for all firm level determinants of cash holdings, culture matters: managers in countries high on uncertainty avoidance hold more liquid assets than those in countries lower on uncertainty avoidance.
Panel B of Table IV shows the results of estimating equation 1 using the sub sample of firmyears with foreign sales greater or equal to zero and greater than zero respectively. This specification allows testing the impact of multinationality (H2) and its interaction with culture (H3) as determinant of liquid holdings. The impact of culture is robust to this new specification. From the table, it can be seen that the coefficient for UNCERT remains positive and significant. Furthermore, consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient of FGN SALES is positive and significant both statistically and economically. A one standard deviation change in multinationality corresponds to a 3% change in the holdings of liquid assets. The more a firm exports, the higher the need for liquid holdings. Intuitively, items such as receivables and inventory are likely to be higher for firms engaged in foreign trade, resulting in higher overall liquid-asset holdings.
Finally, consistent with our hypothesis (H3), the coefficient on the interaction of FGN SALES and UNCERT is negative and significant. This finding is consistent with our proposition that as firms become international, they "learn" and adopt best practices regardless of their country of origin, managers begin comparing their performance on a global scale rather than simply locally.
This learning makes the manager of the firm less subject to the influence of his or her culture.
Different reporting disclosure requirements in different countries could introduce a bias in our sample. Companies reporting foreign sales as zero may not be any different from those firms that simply do not report this information. For this reason, the same model is estimated for the sub sample of firms with foreign sales strictly greater than zero. Results are not materially different from those of the overall sample. Panel C of Table IV shows the results for this specification. It can be seen that for this sub sample, our results hold. Culture (uncertainty avoidance) is an economically and statistically significant determinant of the liquid holdings of firms. This influence, however, is diminished by the degree of multinationality of the firm.
These results are both statistically and economically significant. From the model in panel C, a one standard deviation change in the uncertainty avoidance implies a 5% change in the holdings of liquid assets of the firm. These results are also robust to the proxy used for liquid assets. Results not reported here reveal the same findings using NWC_ASSETS as the proxy for liquid assets instead of CASH 7 . The coefficients for parameters of the other controls are in line with those of identified in Opler et al. (1999) 8 .
Due to the nature of the data, some degree of heteroskedasticity is expected, for this reason a
White test was performed on the regression and the results suggest that the hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected. Consequently, a White consistent variance covariance matrix is calculated and used to test whether the coefficient on UNCERT = coefficient on FGN SALES = coefficient on FGN SALES X UNCERT = 0. The results suggest that the null hypothesis can be strongly rejected in all cases.
As suggested by Pinkowitz et al. (2003) 
7 In fact, the economic significance of culture increases when using net working capital as a proxy for liquid assets.
A one standard deviation change in UNCERT implies a eight percent change in NWC_ASSETS.
In Table V , we explore the relations between cash, culture and multinationality, controlling for country specific institutional variables. Pinkowitz et al. (2003) estimate their model using one institutional proxy at a time. We estimate our model differently; we believe that the model is misspecified unless all proxies for quality of institutions are included at the same time. While undoubtedly some proxies will be correlated, in essence they try to measure distinct aspects of the quality of the institutions of a country. We use a number of proxies for the quality of institutions in estimating the basic model. 
Robustness Tests
To rule out potential mechanical explanations of the results reported so far, we provide a series of robustness tests in this section. First, a concern one may have about the data is the possibility of multicolliniearity among the right-hand variables that could blur the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. For this reason we perform a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test, the results of which are not reported here. All values for VIF are smaller than 10, including those of the interaction of uncertainty avoidance and foreign sales. These results suggest that none of the variables should be dropped in the regressions. Additionally, we perform procedures of maximum R-square and Mallow's Cp. These tests, although not reported here, suggest that uncertainty avoidance and foreign sales have more explanatory power over cash holdings than some of the variables suggested by Opler et al. (1999) . Second, in order to account for all possible firm specific sources of variation in liquid-asset holdings we perform an in between estimation of our model. We calculate the means over time for all relevant variables by firm and then estimate equation 2 for the overall sample as well as for the sub samples of multinational firms using GMM with Newey West robust errors. The results shown on where X is a vector of firm and country level controls. Results for CASH are presented in Table VII Our results could be driven by our failure to incorporate this possibility. Table VIII Panel B incorporates the square of foreign sales a robustness control. The coefficient for this proxy is negative indicating that as firms reach high levels of internationalization they reduce their cash holdings.
Summary and conclusions
What explains the cross-sectional variations in liquid-asset holdings across firms and countries? The paper provides explanations based on differences in national culture and differences in firms' degree of internationalization. We develop several hypotheses of how culture and multinationality interact to influence corporate holdings of liquid assets, controlling for all other known determinants. Firms residing in countries that are high on uncertainty avoidance, as a cultural attribute, would hold more liquid assets, as would firms with high degree of internationalization because of their longer business cycle. On the other hand, the impact of national culture on firm liquidity is moderated by the degree of the firm's multinationality.
We examine empirically the relations among national culture, multinationality and corporate liquid-asset holdings using data on a large panel of firms across 40 countries for the period 1990 through 2000. We find strong evidence consistent with our hypotheses. We find that both national culture and the degree of internationalization of the firm are economically and statistically significant predictors of firms' liquid asset holdings. Firms in countries with high uncertainty avoidance hold more cash. A one standard deviation change in the uncertainty avoidance index across countries produces an 5 percent increase in liquid assets holdings. Moreover, we find that multinationality moderates the effects of national culture on liquid-asset holdings. The predictive power of national culture as an explanatory variable of liquid-asset holdings decreases with the degree of internationalization of the firm.
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, based on a detailed cross-country panel, we identify and document that, in addition to the firm-level determinants of liquidity, national culture explains a significant portion of the cross-country variations in liquidity. Second, against the commonly held view that cash pooling would reduce cash holdings, we report that multinational firms hold more cash than their domestic counterparts. Third, the paper identifies the degree of internationalization of the firm as a potential determinant of its liquidity that moderates the enduring effects of national culture on firm's liquid-asset holdings. Fourth, we provide evidence that after controlling for the internationalization of the firm, previous findings on the quality of institutions of a country do not seem to hold. Finally, we introduce an interdisciplinary perspective in understanding firm's decisions on liquidity, linking the literatures in finance, culture and the theories of the multinational firm.
The findings of the paper provide important implications for future research. While the evidence indicates that culture affects corporate financial decisions, it also underscores that national culture does not affect all firms in the same way. The impact of national culture seems to be more pronounced for firms with less foreign exposure. The implication is that the effects of culture on the financial decisions of the firm should take into account the moderating effects of multinationality. The evidence that multinational firms' decisions are different from domestic firms' implies that crosscountry studies on corporate behavior should properly account for the impacts of firms' degree of internationalization.
